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mark11 Member

Joined: 30 Mar 2014 Posts: 114
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Posted: 17/01/2018 20:15 Post subject: Skygofree |
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Skygofree: Following in the footsteps of HackingTeam
At the beginning of October 2017, we discovered new Android spyware with several features previously unseen in the wild. In the course of further research, we found a number of related samples that point to a long-term development process. We believe the initial versions of this malware were created at least three years ago – at the end of 2014. Since then, the implant’s functionality has been improving and remarkable new features implemented, such as the ability to record audio surroundings via the microphone when an infected device is in a specified location; the stealing of WhatsApp messages via Accessibility Services; and the ability to connect an infected device to Wi-Fi networks controlled by cybercriminals.
Malware Features
Android
Cybercriminals have the ability to control the implant via HTTP, XMPP, binary SMS and FirebaseCloudMessaging (or GoogleCloudMessaging in older versions) protocols. Such a diversity of protocols gives the attackers more flexible control. In the latest implant versions there are 48 different commands. You can find a full list with short descriptions in the Appendix. Here are some of the most notable:
‘geofence’ – this command adds a specified location to the implant’s internal database and when it matches a device’s current location the malware triggers and begins to record surrounding audio.
”social” – this command that starts the ‘AndroidMDMSupport’ service – this allows the files of any other installed application to be grabbed. The service name makes it clear that by applications the attackers mean MDM solutions that are business-specific tools. The operator can specify a path with the database of any targeted application and server-side PHP script name for uploading.
‘wifi’ – this command creates a new Wi-Fi connection with specified configurations from the command and enable Wi-Fi if it is disabled. So, when a device connects to the established network, this process will be in silent and automatic mode. This command is used to connect the victim to a Wi-Fi network controlled by the cybercriminals to perform traffic sniffing and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
‘camera’ – this command records a video/capture a photo using the front-facing camera when someone next unlocks the device.
Some versions of the Skygofree feature the self-protection ability exclusively for Huawei devices. There is a ‘protected apps’ list in this brand’s smartphones, related to a battery-saving concept. Apps not selected as protected apps stop working once the screen is off and await re-activation, so the implant is able to determine that it is running on a Huawei device and add itself to this list. Due to this feature, it is clear that the developers paid excepÈ›ional attention to the work of the implant on Huawei devices.
Also, we found a debug version of the implant (70a937b2504b3ad6c623581424c7e53d) that contains interesting constants, including the version of the spyware.
After a deep analysis of all discovered versions of Skygofree, we made an approximate timeline of the implant’s evolution.
Reverse shell payload
The reverse shell module is an external ELF file compiled by the attackers to run on Android. The choice of a particular payload is determined by the implant’s version, and it can be downloaded from the command and control (C&C) server soon after the implant starts, or after a specific command. In the most recent case, the choice of the payload zip file depends on the device process architecture. For now, we observe only one payload version for following the ARM CPUs: arm64-v8a, armeabi, armeabi-v7a.
Note that in almost all cases, this payload file, contained in zip archives, is named ‘setting’ or ‘setting.o’.
The main purpose of this module is providing reverse shell features on the device by connecting with the C&C server’s socket.
The payload is started by the main module with a specified host and port as a parameter that is hardcoded to ‘54.67.109.199’ and ‘30010’ in some versions:
Alternatively, they could be hardcoded directly into the payload code:
We also observed variants that were equipped with similar reverse shell payloads directly in the main APK /lib/ path.
After an in-depth look, we found that some versions of the reverse shell payload code share similarities with PRISM – a stealth reverse shell backdoor that is available on Github.
https://github.com/andreafabrizi/prism/
Code similarities
We found some code similarities between the implant for Windows and other public accessible projects.
https://github.com/El3ct71k/Keylogger/
It appears the developers have copied the functional part of the keylogger module from this project.
Distribution
We found several landing pages that spread the Android implants.
Skygofree has no connection to Sky, Sky Go or any other subsidiary of Sky, and does not affect the Sky Go service or app.
https://cdn.securelist.com/files/2018/01/Skygofree_appendix_eng.pdf
https://securelist.com/skygofree-following-in-the-footsteps-of-hackingteam/83603/ |
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